Book Reviews for July 2019

A wise man once told me, “If you want to be a leader, you have to be a reader”.

I have found this good advice.  Here are some of the books I have been reading lately, not necessarily in any type of order.

No Second Place Winner,  by Bill Jordan, published in 1965.  This is a classic that everyone should read.  You will find lots of pictures of Jordan shooting one- handed, from the hip, pipe in his mouth, and cowboy hat firmly on his head.  Shooting styles surely have changed, but there is no getting around the fact that this man was an expert with a handgun, who had shot his way out of more than a couple of scrapes in his day.  Interestingly, for all the emphasis on shot- from- the- hip fast draw, Jordan recommends bringing the gun up into the line of sight at distances of seven yards and greater (as Applegate did with his point shooting method), and actually using the sights beyond 15 yards.  This book has lots of quotable passages, but my favorite is: “For ninety percent of your practice, draw from the holster, and fire one shot. It’s that first shot that’s important, and it is the one that is most difficult to place accurately.” True words.

The Complete Book of Combat Handgunning, By Chuck Taylor, published in 1982.  This really is a comprehensive book, covering gear and ammunition selection, weapon maintenance tactics, and strategy.  Taylor is one of the influential shooters from the early days of the Modern Technique of the pistol, and despite what a lot of current trainers like to say about the gun fighting in the post 9-11 world, not much has changed from the techniques Taylor demonstrates in this book (with excellent photographs).  The same cannot be said for handguns, ammunition, and holsters, all of which have improved considerably from the selection that was available in 1982.  The best part of this book, to me, is the section of recommended dryfire and live fire drills.  He recommends 30-45 minutes of dry practice, daily. He considers this a basic level, for more advanced practice, he adds an additional 20 minutes daily.  The live fire drills are challenging, and I would urge anyone who is serious about the pistol to find this book, and try the drills. Chuck Taylor went on to develop the Hand Gun combat master certification which is near legendary in its difficulty.

If Jordan and Taylor were interested in mastering the pistol, Karl Rehn and Jon Daub are at the opposite spectrum, with their newly published book, Strategies and Standards for Defensive Handgun Training. Rehn and Daub recognize that far from spending 45 minutes a day dry practicing with their hand guns, or practicing fast draw by shooting up thousands of specially hand loaded, paraffin wax projectiles, (as Jordan recommends) most civilian pistol carriers will, at best, show up for one, four- hour class per year.  Rehn and Daub try to establish what a minimum standard of skill should be, and how to get a student to that level, in the time that they are willing to spend.  This book is a trove of good information, filled with useful statistics. They even make an attempt to categorize the difficulty level of various common drills.  As much as I like this book, it could have used a better editor.  The information is a bit disorganized, and they have an annoying habit of referencing a drill, but not describing it, advising readers to “look it up on the internet”.  If I wanted to do that, I wouldn’t have had to buy the book, not to mention that many drills are not standardized, and it is difficult to know if the version of, say, the “Casino drill”, which you can find online, is the same one that the authors are referencing.  If you do any handgun instruction at all, you should read this book; if you don’t teach, you probably won’t find it interesting.

I like to read a lot of first person accounts by regular G.I.s, and Jumping From Helicopters, by John Stillman, is just one of the most recent I have found.  It contains a good, firsthand account of a paratrooper in Vietnam.

The Farnam Method of Defensive Handgunning, By John S. Farnam, published in 2000, is yet another gun-fighting manual, but it contains very little information that is redundant to the similar books I have already mentioned here.  Aside from excellent coverage of gun handling and self- defense, this book covers: dealing with law enforcement, confronting criminals, use- of- force considerations, and even touches on first aid.  The best part, for me, was Farnam’s extensive coverage of the traditional, double action pistol; a system that doesn’t get much coverage from serious gun writers, in spite of its popularity with police and militaries around the world. Farnam loves charts, comparing the various attributes of different pistols and ammunitions, and I found the chart comparing the workings of various traditional, double action pistols to be quite enlightening.  Many of these systems are very different from each other, in spite of being classified as the same.

If you are interested in a deeper dive into military history, Martin Van Creveld’s The Culture of War, and his History of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to William S. Lind, are a pair of books that I have recently read.  Van Creveld writes succinctly, with an easy- to- read style, which, layman though I am, I found easy to understand.  His books are filled with a dry humor (at one point, he refers to T. E. Lawrence as “a typical British Eccentric”).  I have only recently discovered this author, and plan to read more of his works in the future.

Another recent discovery, for me, is Tony Hillerman, who wrote detective fiction set on the Navajo reservation, and starring Lieutenant Joe Leaphorn.  The mysteries are clever, the characters interesting, and Hillerman weaves in a lot of detail about Navajo culture, history, and religion that I find fascinating.  I’ve read four of these, and immensely enjoyed every one, although Sacred Clowns is my favorite so far.

I know a lot of people who have snobbish disdain for fiction, usually characterizing their thoughts by saying, with words or demeanor, “I only have time to read serious books.”  This attitude is as sophomoric as it is stupid.  Oftentimes, more truth can be conveyed in a good work of fiction, than in an entire library of technical manuals, so don’t be ashamed to mix a little quality fiction into your reading.

We have more written material available to us than at any previous time in history, anything you want to know, someone has written a book about it.  While there is no substitute for hands on experience, we can gain a huge leg up by reading about the work of those who have gone before us.

Knowledge Based Decision Making METT-TC

I once had a student in a pistol class ask me, “Should I even try to take a shot at twenty five yards with a handgun?”

As Jeff Hall likes to say, the answer to every gun fighting question is, “It depends”.  Do you have an avenue of escape?  Is the person you have correctly isolated as the enemy, positioned in a crowd of bystanders?   Another way of putting it would be, what is the danger if you do take the shot, and what are the hazards if you don’t?

Instead of being encouraged to think through these problems, all too often, CCW students are given “always” and “never” solutions to their questions.  One of my pet peeves is the oft- repeated rule of gun fighting: “Always create distance”.  Always? Really?  This rule grows out of the somewhat better maxim: “Distance favors the better trained man”.  The assumption is that if a student has any training at all, he will shoot more accurately than the average street villain, and thus would fare better at a long range gun fight than one at close range.  However, this idea does not take into account all of the situations wherein it might be advantageous to close with your opponent.*

One- size- fits- all answers may be comforting, but they are woefully inadequate for solving tactical problems.  The thinking man would be aided by a device which helps insure he considers all of the pertinent facts.  Infantry soldiers are taught to use the acronym METT-TC to sort out these questions, and I believe it is profitable for the CCW practitioner to use as well.

The acronym stands for:

Mission-  What do you need to do?

Enemy-  Who is shooting at you?

Terrain/weather-  Where is this all happening, and what are the conditions?

Troops and support-  Are you alone, or with someone else?  What tools do you have at your disposal?

Time-  How quickly do you need to complete your mission?

Civilian considerations-  Are there bystanders to think about?

How is this likely to look for a typical CCW situation?  Let’s say that late one night you discover that you are out of milk, and you will need milk for the kids’ breakfast in the morning, thus your wife sends you out to get milk. She also has you take the two-year-old with you, because she’s driving her mother crazy, and mommy would like to have thirty minutes of peace and quiet.

So the breakdown would look something like this:

Mission- Get a gallon of milk at the all- night quick mart, taking the toddler with you.  The desired end state of this mission? You the baby and a gallon of milk all arrive back home in half an hour.

Enemy-  Obviously you don’t expect to run into an enemy, but if you did how would you recognize him?  Street villains don’t wear uniforms, and even the presence of a weapon does not automatically make someone an enemy.  We determine an enemy based on his behavior.  We are wary of people who act aggressively, hide their hands, and invade our space, among other danger cues. What capabilities do we expect the enemy to have?  Are we facing a lone villain with a snub-nosed 38, and no training,  or a terrorist organization, armed with carbines and explosives?  What if the enemy is armed with a tire iron, or a knife, or maybe no weapon at all?  What does the enemy want? Is he after money, a car, a hostage, or does he simply want to kill people?  Unfortunately, unlike the infantryman, who should receive a mission brief outlining the enemy uniform, weapons, and organizational and capabilities, we don’t know what type of enemy we might face. We must be ready to identify a potentially threatening person or persons, and answer these questions about the enemy on the fly, as the situation unfolds.  It is advisable to study current trends in crime.

Terrain and weather-  Are we going to be in a town, with buildings and lighted streets, or on a rural highway?  Do you know what parts of a car or a building will stop bullets?  Weather is also an important factor. Are you wearing a heavy coat what will slow access to your Glock 19,  or has hot summer weather dictated that you switch to your more concealable, but less powerful, and harder- to- shoot .380?

Troops and Support-  In this scenario you are alone. If your wife came along, would she be armed?  What are her capabilities?  Have you discussed how to handle a difficult situation?  Do you have cell phone service where you are going?  What is the police response time?  How will you identify yourself to the police as a good guy?  How about ambulance response times?

Time available- Normally we don’t think of time hacks in the way the military does. We don’t have to secure the bridge by dawn, or anything like that, but we do have to consider time as a situation unfolds. Can you wait, and strike at a moment of advantage, or do you have to get rounds on target before a knife- wielding enemy can close within striking range, as in the famous Tuler drill?  Again, this is an assessment you will have to make on the fly.

Civilian Considerations- Are there bystanders?  How will they react?  What will you need to do to avoid harming anyone but the bad guys?

The next time you step out of you door armed, make short mental rundown of the METT-TC acronym. With practice, you will not need more than a minute or two, and this practice will help to solve (and avoid) the tactical questions.

 

*The use of distance can be illustrated with horses. I’m sure that everyone understands that if you are far enough away from a horse, it cannot kick you. More experienced equestrians know that the horse also cannot kick you if you are too close to him.  Only with practice will you understand where that danger area lies, and when it is wisest to move closer and when to move farther away.

On the Advice of My Attorney

Gun guys are famous, or rather, infamous, for giving terrible legal advice.  Hang around a gun shop for an afternoon, and you will hear advice involving planting throw downs, moving bodies, and magic phrases which, when uttered to the cops, make you immune to prosecution, just to name three of the most popular fallacies.  It is quite common, even likely, that someone who is an expert on guns, is completely unknowledgeable about the criminal justice system.

Conversely, I have read and heard some absolutely terrible advice from lawyers, when it comes to guns.  Even in the rare case that a trial lawyer is also a gun guy, he will tend to be more concerned with the legal problems than any self-defense problems.  I am not an attorney, and my purpose here is not to lay out the final word on firearms and self-defense law, but to lay out a common sense framework for making decisions (one’s own decisions) about the interplay of self- defense and criminal law.

The first question I would ask, when considering new information, is: “will this advice materially diminish my ability to defend myself?”  For instance, most lawyers will tell you to resist the temptation to adorn your weapon with decorations such as skulls, or Confederate battle flags.  I recently heard of a cop who was under extra scrutiny, because the AR that he shot someone with had the words, “you’re f@#%” engraved on the inside of the dust cover.  A prosecutor will try to prove that you have, as Attorney Kevin Jamison says, “macho Rambo fantasies”.  These sorts of decorations play into that narrative, and I don’t see how any of these decorations actually make your gun a more effective tool.

Another piece of advice I frequently hear from the legal world, also has to do with public perception.  An example of such advice would be to choose a defensive weapon based on whether or not it is seen as a “good” or “bad” gun by the public.  Usually, guns that look like something your grandpa took hunting are considered “good”, and guns that are carried by gangsters and Nazis in the movies are perceived as “bad”.  Former Vice President Joe Biden, a lawyer, famously advised the legal efficacy of the double- barreled shotgun, as a defensive weapon, over the AR 15.  On this advice, I would refer back to my first question: “Will this advice materially diminish my ability to defend myself?” Jason Bourn notwithstanding, I would be far more effective with the AR than the fowling piece.  There might, however, be a point at which the public perception of a particular weapon might be so negative, as to override any tactical advantage the weapon might give.  One example might be anything full- auto.  In many states, you can legally own an M60, but using a belt-fed weapon to repulse the crackhead trying to steal your IPad at 3am will certainly bring the kind of attention from law enforcement that you don’t want.

If I find that a lawyer’s advice does hamper my ability to defend myself, the next question I ask is: “Is there another way to achieve the advantage I want?”  Case- in- point: most lawyers will tell you to never disable, remove, or tamper with the safety mechanism on your weapon.  If you are one of those people who does not like safeties (and there are many reasons why you might not want an external safety), there are many models that come from the factory without a safety.  Why tamper with a gun’s safety mechanism, and run the risk of having to explain to a jury that this was really not a dangerous or reckless thing to do, when you can buy one that never had a safety to start with?

If the answer to the first question is Yes, and the answer to the second question is No, I then ask myself: “What is the problem the lawyer is trying to avoid with this advice?”

Most of these legal warnings we have discussed so far have to do with customizing your gun. Believe it or not, there have been court cases where the prosecutor tried to make hay out of modifications as small as adding custom grips or stocks (although to my knowledge this line of argument has never gotten any traction, but one that has is the “trigger job”).

Whether or not to modify a trigger is a tough question. Factory triggers are almost universally terrible, and there is no other modification that will improve the performance of your firearm as dramatically as a good trigger job.  This is an area where the legal advice conflicts directly with sound tactical judgement, and there is little middle ground in this area.

If the court is discussing your equipment, you have probably already made a number of mistakes; or been incredibly unlucky.  Usually the argument for the dangerous “hair trigger” comes up if there is a question as to whether the shooting is a self- defense shooting, or an accident caused by a negligent discharge.  Killing someone in self- defense is perfectly legal; accidentally shooting someone is called manslaughter and is not.

When recklessness or negligence is at question, it would be helpful if you can show documentation that you have trained extensively with your carry gun, with its enhanced trigger.  Extensive and organized training, with your carry weapon, should also help you to avoid these uncomfortable legal situations in the first place.

Always remember that you are the one who will ultimately be responsible for your actions, consider the advice of the lawyers and the tacticians and make your own decisions.

Field Training Exercise AAR, Two opposing views

I am publishing here the Patrol leaders AARs from the Spring 2017 One Shepherd FTX.  I was the patrol leader for the BlueFOR, my Friend Mike Kleine was the OpFOR Patrol leader, he has graciousness permitted me to publish his AAR, so you can read both sides of the story.

Photo by Robin Werling

Spring 2017 FTX Blue For AAR

Operation Tears in The Rain

Or

Whisky Tango FRA-GO

I was assigned Blue For patrol leader for this FTX.

Bluefor was the PRK, we were in the north and Opfore was the MR, they were based in the south

Start-Ex: 5/31/2017

Mission: Conduct passage of lines into DSM at grid 483/195 to conduct area recon on suspected enemy positions occupying high ground within AO Hound. Advance east along northing line 1930 to LOA at easting line 4940 NLT 1700 HRS.  Pursue and destroy all ENY forces in the area.

The plan: The plan was straight forward we would patrol in, establish a patrol base and patrol along the ridgeline overlooking our defensive border from west to east. Given that we were to pursue the enemy, and the large area that we were to cover (AO Hound is 1200 meters long and some 300 meters deep) and the small size of our patrol, (just seven including myself) I instructed my guys to pack as light as possible.

I set phase lines and communicated them to higher so that we could stay on task and communicate our movement easily to higher.

Vignette 1A NTL 1100R 6/1/2017

Before we could step off, we were FRA-GOed- and re-tasked with another mission.

Mission: Conduct passage of lines into AO Fox on the Northern side (the friendly side) of the PRK border. Conduct patrol operations from Easting 4850 to LOA at easting Line 4940. RTB NLT 1430 HRS. Report to FUC IOT brief on findings from patrol.

Plan: AO Fox is mostly open fields bordered on the north by a road an on the south by a creek, which is also our FLOT.  I set one fire team to patrol the creek and the other would move parallel to us on the road, thus we would have eyes on the entire area and if we became engaged the team on the road could move quickly to support with a flanking motion. We set phase lines and would use radios to keep the teams moving roughly parallel.

Performance: They say no plan survives first contact, I guess that is why this one plan went off without hitch, we covered all the ground and made through inspection of the area, finding nothing and making no enemy contact.  The only problem we incurred was that one of our more experienced team members had a preexisting medical condition flair up, and he was force to drop out. Bringing our numbers down to six.  When I debriefed the FUC he was obviously disappointed with the outcome of the mission.

 

Vignette 1B NTL 1500R 6/12017

Mission: this was the same mission we had before the Frag-O, but with different time hacks

Plan: Our plan was the same.

Performance: we made our passage of lines and stepped off.  We established a patrol base and while we were still in it, we made enemy contact. They fell back to the east and successfully broke contact.  We patrolled on line eastward and regained contact around Easting line 48500, we sustained 33% casualties, broke contact and fell back to the patrol base.

We moved the patrol base and continued our patrol to the east.  We patrolled all the way to the LOA and then back to the patrol base, we left three people there to begin their rest cycle and took three to set an ambush at a trail junction.  After sitting in ambush for about an hour we returned to the patrol base and were settling down for the night, when At 2400 the OpFor came by within about 20 feet of our P.B. they were tired inattentive and moving fast.  They would have been an easy target, but with only two people in harness at the time, and the enemy in safety kill range we could have only killed two of them before they turned and destroyed us.  We let them pass.

Vignette 2 NTL 1800R 6/1/2017

Mission: We were to patrol in to the east end of AO hound and search for a suspected enemy supply cache.

Plan: We sent a two man team ahead to secure the path and set an ambush at a critical trail junction, the main body would follow and begin the search.  The area we were to search was some 300 meters by three hundred meters, so I decided to search first along the trails in the assumption that the enemy would not want to carry the bulky supplies far from the trail.

Performance: We did find the cache about twenty meters form the trail.  We then received orders to set and ambush on the cache.  We were not in ambush long before the OpFor showed up.  We opened fire with devastating effect. They broke back and we pushed forward trying to regain contact we hit them again near 48500 and an intense fire fight broke out.  The enemy tried to break contact, but we pushed hard, maintaining contact and flanking on both left and right.  In the midst of this chaos I was not in control directing the fight, but all of my guys knew what to do and fought incredibly hard.  The enemy broke south heading for our southernmost LOA, three of my guys sprinted the long way around at least a quarter mile and cut off their retreat just in time.

Issues: We had a communication difficulty when we radioed to the ambush team the we were moving west of the power line, they thought we were only beginning to move west, so when they saw us emerge in an area where they did not expect us they nearly shot us.

Fixes: Communicating movement over the radio is extremely difficult and brevity codes should be worked out ahead of time.

Sustains: At times command and control will break down, our plan to ambush merged into a pursuit, but, because my guys all understood their commanders intent we were able to effectively cut the enemy off from retreat.

Vignette 3b  NTL 1030 6/2/2017

Mission: 11:00 HRS begin recon of AO Raccoon, Identify high speed avenues of approach in preparation of further movement to the south.  NLT 1800 hours establish a patrol base on/at/near grid 4830/1905.

Plan: We would patrol in and set up our patrol base then set a rest cycle of two men up, two down and two on patrol.

Execution: At this point we received a new and experienced team member, bringing our number back up to seven.

We patrolled in, set up our patrol base and began our rest, watch patrol cycle. Our two man patrols made some light contact with the enemy throughout the day but sustained no casualties.

Around this time our morale was lagging.  We had just come off a big success, which usually brings elation, but instead we were incredibly discouraged.  A large part of it may have been shear physical exhaustion, we had just fought a running battle that covered over 600 meters, on a warm June day.

Issues: My attitude was a problem, I was angry irritable and it was affecting my guys.

Sustains: We were actually accomplishing our mission, keeping pressure on the enemy and getting some much needed rest; although you wouldn’t know it from the way we felt.

Vignette 4 NTL 1800r date 6/2/2017

Mission: 200 HRS to 2300 HRS Conduct PSYOP operations in/on/at vicinity of grid 485/189

Plan: We would assign a two man team to shout insult at the enemy with a bull horn, while the rest of the team would form a protective cordon around them.  They would shout insults for ten minutes, then end the tirade with the phrase “China Town” which would be the signal to collapse the security cordon and move to a new location to repeat.  I hoped that by moving frequently we might be able to keep the enemy from maneuvering on us

Performance: I asked a young Korean kid on our team to think up the best Korean insults he could think of to shout at the enemy, he took on this task with relish. This ended up being one of the more fun exercises of the event, even though the enemy eventually maneuvered successfully on us and cooked our goose.

Issues: I really don’t know how to correctly conduct a mission like this, this is the second time I have seen it end in a devastating assault.

Vignette 5 NTL 2200 date 6/2/2017

Mission: NLT 0700 move into AO Coyote IOT destroy enemy forces in the vicinity, exploit breach and destroy suspected HQ vicinity grid 483/186

Plan: The plan doesn’t really matter, because next morning, before step off we got FRA-GOed

 

Vignette 6 NTL 0600 6/3/2017

Mission: Hold position, until contacted by 1^st PLT A. CO or direct action with the enemy, conduct delay and retrograde operations, IOT allow withdraw of 1^st PLT A. CO.  Enemy forces moving north through AO Hound along easting line 483.  Withdraw to PRK border NTL 1000

Plan: I placed a two man team to our front, one to the left flank and had one fall back to the first creek crossing to cover our retreat.  We would hold our position until untenable then fall back to the north side of the creek at 19150, then hold there and fall back to 19250.

Execution: The plan worked well. My guys fought like terriers, we had good ground and the enemy paid for every inch they gained; in spite of their aggressive and well led assault.  Morale had recovered, we had all gotten some sleep and had a mission that made sense to us. We fought and fell back, preventing the enemy from flanking us until their attack finally stalled out at 19250, where we held them until end-EX. Our retrograde covered approximately three hundred meters.

Overall assessment:

The OpFor was aggressive and well lead.  After our first engagement I determined that they were better gunfighters than we were and that we would have to be careful what battles we picked.  That assessment held true though the exercise. They were truly formidable fighters, but I think we made better use of terrain.

Bluefor was; I think, amazingly successful, we accomplished every mission, on time and with satisfactory results. We effectively controlled the battle space and forced the enemy to fight on our terms, and we did it covering an enormous AO with only six guys.

This is my sixth FTX and by far the most challenging. It was certainly tough physically, but the real challenges were mental.

We come to One Shepherd to attempt difficult things.  We expect to be challenged, and sometimes those challenges come from angles we didn’t expect.  We don’t always step off feeling mentally or physically ready for the mission, where the metal touches meat, I expect that is the rule rather than the exception.  Sometimes white cell makes mistakes, as do we.  The why of the mission dose not always makes sense. Sometimes the OC gets drawn in to the passion and movement of the fight and makes a bad call.  There are times when you make a sound decision, only to have your motives and character called into question.  Sometimes you lash out at those who don’t deserve it.  None of this is OK, but it is what we come here for, to do hard things.  We come to find our failure points, and when we find them it is publicly in the view of people whose opinion we value.  This is why we have an AAR process, we find our failures, identify fixes, then ruck up to do it again.

Special thanks to all the staff and cadre who put together this difficult and complex event with so little manpower.

Special thanks to everyone on OpFor, you guys were energetic and tenacious, we can’t have a war without and enemy.

Finally special thanks to the guys of BlueFor, you not only endured but prevailed, you have no idea how proud I am of each of you.

Photo by Joe Magoffin

 

OPFOR 2017 FTX AAR

Operation Tears in the Rain

AKA

Whisky Tango FRA-GO

 

MISSION (Company):Meramec Recondo (MR)2^nd PLT, Charlie CO will advance North into AO HAMMER IOT establish ammunition cache, forward communication node, and conduct reconnaissance on ENY defensive positions in preparation for follow on support of Insurgency activities within PRK.

 

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose:       RECON of ENY defensive positions and establish communication node.

Key Tasks:

• Insert into AO HAMMER
• Establish equipment cache.
• Establish forward patrol base.
• Establish communication node.
• Establish communications with higher and insurgents.
• Relay all PIR to higher units.
• Fight retrogrades to extraction if compromised.

 

End State:     Friendly forces forward staged south of PRK in preparation for follow on activities.

 

MISSION (Platoon):2^nd PLT, C CO MR O/O NLT 1200 HRS vehicle insertion into AO HAMMER at Tannhauser Gate grid 49091919.  Conduct passage of lines with 3rd PLT C. CO. FUC at FLOT.  Establish ammunition cache between easting lines 489 and 494 for insurgency resupply effort.  Advance west along northing line 1930, Recon high ground within AO HAMMER.  Establish radio communication node on/at/near grid 484193 NLT 1500.  Attempt to make contact with Insurgency IOT arrange clandestine link up for material support drop in AO FALCON at location/time TBD with insurgent group.  Should significant contact occur, call higher for extraction, conduct retrograde operations, and move to extraction point at Tannhauser Gate.

 

Plan: Establish the hide site just east of the powerlines, put the cache due west of that just shy of easting line 489 inside the treeline. Move west along northing line 1930 and establish radio communication note at 484193. Conduct light recon inside AO hammer. Make contact with insurgency group. Move back to extraction point once completed. If contacted, communicate with higher and perform retrograde back to FLOT.

 

Performance:  After vehicle insertion at Tannhauser gate we established 360 security and met with the FUC to conduct passage of lines. I performed a leader recon with a security team and had the guide take us through the FLOT. I posted my security team at the edge of the FLOT at the release point and returned to my team with the guide. I gathered my men with their rucks and equipment, and my security team’s rucks, carrying additional ammunition and water to establish the insurgency cache. We again conducted passage of lines with the guide. I met up with my security team, they rucked up and we proceeded north. We used the highest point along the power lines as a terrain feature and dog legged east into the tree line about 15 meters and established our hide site.

From there we conducted a slls halt, updated higher and proceeded due east to establish our cache site. We ended up establishing it on the edge of the wood line 1 meter in and 15 meters north of the mutt trail. Again contacted higher and observed an OD Green Opfor A-10 flying low in a north easterly direction of travel towards the enemy FLOT. I’m sure they were there to provide aerial support by fire if needed. I had my APL and a security team recon the parameter of our cache. After they got back, without any enemy contact, I performed a leader recon to be able to terrain associate back to the cache quickly if needed. We then moved out 25 meters south of our position performing a patch to the road crossing the mutt trail, then proceeded west, establishing an ERP 2 meters in the woodline before the field. We performed an approach march across the field in a Vee formation, establishing another ERP after crossing the field in the far side treeline. We then moved south which necessitated conducting a patch to the road across the mutt trail.  After crossing the gap in fence line we pushed south slightly west another 25 meters and we established another ERP. Turning west we headed to the OBJ, 50 meters north of a pond. I settled my guys in and made contact with higher. We tried to establish communication with operative Grinder, however, he was not receiving us.

Since we were hours ahead of schedule I had my men improve their positions, performing shell scraps and setting them into place. I also sent out a security team to beat the brush 50 yards around our position. Near our NLT time we established contact with operative Grinder and received time and location for linkup. I contacted higher and requested extraction. I got my men up and proceeded to move east towards our insertion point. We then received new orders to halt and move west instead. I turned my guys around and proceed west. After we pushed 100 meters past our OBJ, we came into enemy contact and immediately incurred 1 casualty. Since our orders were to perform a retrograde, when met with resistance I ordered my men to break contact and we headed back to our ERP per our established battle drill.

We swiftly withdrew to our ERP and radioed higher about our enemy contact. We then pushed back again to our next ERP. Once there we radioed higher for an extraction and requested one reinforcement which was granted, while we waited for extraction details. After several minutes we again encountered enemy contact from the west. I got my guys online and the enemy incurred several casualties. I sent out a team to push their right flank but at about that time I received orders to withdraw, so I recalled the flank team. We got into enemy contact again, so I pushed the flank team out again. We then received extraction information so I again recalled my flank team, but the enemy also broke contact with us around that same time so it worked out. We voluntarily withdrew to the release point, got in contact with higher, pushed our guys into the woodline near the release point and waited for the guide. We conducted passage of lines back to the insertion point, loaded up in mutts and were vehicle inserted to OPFOR HQ.

 

Fixes:  Tell higher to wait out while in contact, and don’t get back into contact with them until it is clear the situation has changed. During my first leader recon I did not take a security team with me and my GOTWA was incomplete. This was rectified swiftly with the help of OC correction after I was allowed to fail. Concealment and location of cache was an issue I gambled on insuring it could easily be relocated which aided in its discovery by the enemy later on.

Sustains:  The 360 security at all halts really saved our bacon in the second engagement. The ERPs were huge during withdrawals; all the men knew exactly where we needed to go so my focus was on my formations, accountability and scanning for enemy presence. The battle drills we did on the run up to step off were great; they gave a clear picture to the guys of what they needed to do. Also the Whistles and the unit SOI for their use was fantastic. The men responded well to them and were a great aid in command and control. We also kept the whistle SOI very short, simply withdraw, rally, and reinforce (less was more). Active OC participation to insure proper procedures were followed was of great assistance. They were not doing my job for me by any means, however, if they saw short comings they were helpful in pointing them out so the mistake was not repeated. The leader recon around the cache site was very useful during a later follow on. The men knew what was expected out of them and they performed above and beyond. All missions were accomplished and all time hacks were met. When we were in contact with the enemy we gave better than we got.

 

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose:       To deny ENY access to DSM territory.

Key Tasks:             

1. Establish Patrol Base with AO SHIELD.
2. Defend FLOT
3. Make Clandestine Linkup with Insurgency within AO FALCON.
4. Maintain communications with higher units.

 

End State:     Maintain high state of readiness, improve intelligence picture of any boarder activities.

Advance into AO HOUND IOT to displace suspected DSM forces from high ground.

 

MISSION (Platoon):MR2^nd PLT, C CO Relieve 1st PL C. CO, Establish Patrol bases within AO SHIELD, south of defensive line/FLOT.  O/O 2000 HRS conduct passage of lines at defensive line/FLOT, move to clandestine linkup with insurgency contact within AO FALCON at arranged location.  Return to AO SHIELD patrol base NLT 0000 HRS.

 

Plan: Establish a patrol base 100m south of our FLOT and secure the FLOT up to 2000 hrs then move north hand railing off Daphne’s fence line back to the cache site using it as an ORP and as an easting line, move north from there cross over the enemy’s FLOT (west/east creek) and link up with the insurgency NLT 2300 delivering the ammo crate that we received at our HQ.

Performance:  After being inserted at OPFOR HQ we ate dinner and regrouped. I received new orders to setup a patrol base at least 100 meters south of the FLOT. We were also instructed to take 2 water cans and an ammo crate for later follow on. I briefed the men and then we rucked up and proceeded towards the FLOT. We settled in an old growth cedar thicket that had a winding animal trail or water drainage path leading towards the FLOT. It was a near perfect fit for concealment, location, and could be back tracked to at night. After establishing the patrol base, I lead my men down to the FLOT and had them spread out across the line to secure it.

Fixes: It might have been a good idea to have laid out our bedding in advance. After we returned to our patrol base for the night it took the men upwards of 45mins to get settled in, which cut into to their rest cycle. I also should have been thinking about getting the men on a rest cycle right after establishing the patrol base; we were still fresh so I just didn’t think about it at the time.

Sustains: I tried to get the patrol base as close to the FLOT and as downhill as possible. It was also located in such a manner that it was found readily on our return. Nothing worse than stumbling around in the woods at night uphill cursing for rest.

 

Performance:  As we neared our step off time I coordinated with the FUC and we conducted passage of lines through the FLOT, ammo crate in tow per our instructions. We patrolled due north across the field hand railing off Daphne’s fence. After we got into the thick brush, our Vee formation was channelized into 2 separate columns that further channelized into 1 single column once we hit our northern boundary fence and made a left turn to approach the “gap in the fence line”. That’s when our APL spotted enemy movement just on the other side of the fence. My EDM was quick; this clearly wasn’t ours since our mission was a clandestine linkup with the insurgency and contact with the enemy could clearly compromise our mission. So I ordered my men to hit the dirt and we waited for 10 minutes in waist high weeds to give the enemy patrol time to pass by. Unsure of what their status was, I went ahead and got my guys on line and approached the edge of the fence. The enemy had clearly moved on, so I had my men go through the fence gap and proceed on mission due east towards our initial cache site that I was using as an ORP.

Once we hit the cache site it was getting very dark; pitch black under the canopy. I had my guys get into column formation. I donned my NODs and took the lead on a compass heading due north. The terrain was so thick with branches and the like that the NODs did little good and a compass heading was all that was truly being used. After traveling north for 300 meters we encountered an impassable boundary or at least something I wasn’t about to take my men through at night, it was extremely steep, rugged, and with bushiness that was obscuring its nature. So we hand railed off of it for 100 meters or so heading west, where we eventually came to a location where we could pass through the creek and get into the northern field. I sent a security team across and had the rest of my men stay on the southern side of the terrain feature.

We waited for a couple of hours while trying to make radio/visual contact with the insurgency. After approaching our NLT with no visual contact, I had my whole team cross the terrain feature. We began hand-railing off the western tree line in the northern field, or so I thought. A few things were out of place though; the field was brushier then I remembered it, and we were walking up hill! At about that time my APL comes running up to me “Hey we’re heading south!” I pull out my compass and he was correct!  So, I shot an azimuth due north and crossed over into the northern field at the easiest crossing point, now not paying much heed to my east/west position, which meant I just lead my men through a mine field! After crossing into the northern field, we spotted the insurgents, we signaled to them with red light and I sent a 2-man security team to contact them. The team returned with the insurgents and we made good on the delivery. I got my team back up, and we headed straight back to our patrol base tired, and I was baffled as to how I got turned around like that.

 

Fixes:  I should have gauged my men’s competency with land navigation prior to step off and had one of them run compass and pace count; I shouldn’t have taken that all on myself. I should have known my men better. Later the next day I found that there were some amongst us that were extremely proficient in land navigation and I should have been utilizing them. I also shouldn’t have put myself out as point man for obvious reasons. Also, always pull your compass out after crossing a terrain feature as it may not be what you think it is, especially at night. I later learned that on our return, we went right past the enemy’s patrol base. We were tired and thinking about our fart sacks, leaving situational awareness behind. I was also still dwelling on my previous land nav. failings. I needed to have kept my head up and let my earlier frustrations roll down my back.

 

Sustains:  Allowing the enemy to bypass us was a good call since getting into an engagement with them could have compromised our whole mission. My men did a great job not jumping the gun and kicking off a firefight that might have changed the whole course of events. We left a figurative “bread crumb” in the form of a dead branch in the edge of the woodline due north of our patrol base which allowed us to locate it very swiftly and easily at night. Frequent head counts insured no one got separated, and the NODs helped avoid the northern creek drop off from injuring anyone.

 

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose:       To deny ENY access to DSM territory forward of FLOT conduct screening operations

Key Tasks:             

• Conduct Stand To
• Defend FLOT
• Conduct screening operations forward of FLOT
• Maintain communications with higher units.

 

End State: Locate and engage ENY unit(s) IOT keep PRK forces away from the FLOT.

 

MISSION (Platoon):MR2^nd PLT, C CO Conduct Stand To, Followed on by Passage of Lines at FLOT NLT 0730 HRS. Conduct screening patrol operations forward of defensive line/FLOT to northing line 193 until 1700 HRS.

 

Plan:  Stand two at 0500. Get all troops up on the FLOT. Recon in force at 0730

 

Performance:  After getting to our patrol base we set a light watch with only 1 man on security each hour. Prioritizing rest for my guys was a big deal at this point. We set stand two for 0500. The night passed without incident. Come morning I had my men pack their rucks and get up on the FLOT providing security as we took turns eating MREs, watching the line, and airing our feet out. Our APL was on top of foot care providing foot powder and tape.

I got my guys up to perform a recon in force of AO hammer. Once in the AO I was frago’ed to retrieve or destroy if need be the cache we put in place earlier yesterday. We were all pretty fatigued at this point and wanted nothing to do with carrying crates, but orders were orders. I was going to lug at least one of those suckers back even if I had to do so myself, but I knew I wouldn’t have to, my men were there for me. Boy, we didn’t want to carry them though. We moved forward using the same ERPs we used yesterday. We pushed across the hill top field making a bee line for our cache in a Vee formation. Command and control was suffering, my men ahead of me were looking down at their feet now more than scanning their sectors, much less looking back to affirm where I was wanting them. I was having to shout to get their attention. The fatigue was clearly taking a toll on our readiness. About 50 yards away from our cache site my formation started funneling along the mutt trail. As I was attempting to get them spread back out, we got hit. Most of the gunfire was to our right; our cache was to our left. I had my guys race to the cache site. It was already blown when we got there. We were in a very disorganized state at this point. We incurred heavy casualties and my men were scattered. I sounded the rally call and had half my guys rejoin me, one member made his way on his own to our last ERP and the rest were KIA. I reorganized the ones around me and we contacted our separated member via radio. We then made our way back to the ERP.

At this point my men were reinvigorated and spoiling for a fight. That’s when we noticed our ERP was right next to the enemy’s patrol base. We blew their sustainment gear up, got on line and waited; ready to bloody their nose this time. As soon as they came into view we lit them up. We got some of them but they started pushing our flanks hard. We fell back in buddy teams about 25 yards through the woods, and bounded across the mutt trail by ones under enemy fire. We crossed the hole in the fence still under enemy pressure. I was providing rear security and maintaining accountability while my APL cleared the way ahead of us. Once we all got across we started pushing west taking gunfire from the west, north, and east.  We felt completely encircled, but kept pushing hard west, running into frontal ambush after ambush. We shot out of the woodline cutting the corner off the southern field and made it into the north-south connecting woodline pushing south. To our shock and horror, as we approached the creek in front of us we again came under enemy gunfire. At this point we had incurred no less than 50% casualties. The remainder reconsolidated after the creek and RTB.

The rest of the day I had my men on a heavy rest cycle for the most part. I was sending out 3 and 4 man screening patrols, and had guys on a 30-50% rest cycle. We had to resupply our water as well since we had already gone through 2 full water jugs at this point from our work load. I also maintained at least 2 men up on the FLOT at all times and had them improve their positions by creating shell scrapes, followed by fighting positions and sector sketches.

 

Fixes:  I should have addressed the command and control issues immediately even if it meant pulling my formation back, getting it halted, rested and coached before continuing. Allowing it to plod along with that level of indifference was dangerous.

Sustains:  I thought my team did an excellent job once in the fight. I couldn’t have asked for a better group of warriors. They were on point. We stayed organized and focused. Even with how hard we were being pushed we gave as good as we got if not more.

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose:       To deny ENY access to AO SHIELD.

Key Tasks:             

• Maintain defensive line
• Maintain communications with higher units.
• Engage any confirmed PRK forces within DSM

 

End State: deny ENY access to AO SHIELD along defensive line to AO SHIELD.

 

MISSION (Platoon):MR2^nd PLT, C COO/O 1700 HRSMR detachment 2^ndPlt C. CO will maintain defenses along edge of AO SHEILD.

 

Plan: Improve fighting positions and defensive coordination along our FLOT.

Performance:  Once my APL came back from patrol, I instructed him on our orders to defend the FLOT and my thoughts on establishing LPOs, running TA field phones to them and fighting positions, and how to use the men on rest cycle as a reserve if need be. This is when my APL reiterated the men’s condition and how I needed to be prioritizing rest, and that I needed to get rest myself. I relented under his sage wisdom and we compromised by ensuring that those manning the LPOs would be equipped with whistles rather than field phones and we reduced the amount of men on the line. We also discussed moving the patrol base up to the FLOT since our primary task was defense of the FLOT and the standards that a patrol base shouldn’t be used longer than 24 hours. I grabbed my rucksack and went on a rest cycle.

 

Fixes: At this point rest was becoming critical. I was conflicted with security/mission performance vs my men’s condition. I needed to have rest as a key component from the onset.

Sustains:  Listen to your APL; it’s important to be thinking about your mission but it’s just as important to maintain readiness. I also must give big props to Ben. He did a fantastic job on his fighting position. When complemented on it he shrugged and simply stated, “I read Chris’ book”. Also, Lorenzo did a great job navigating his way back to our HQ to get that water resupply and back to our patrol base. Tell did a great job leading that patrol to gather key intel on enemy troop movements and sticking with it through all the radio frustration; he never gave up.

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose:       To deny ENY free movement within DSM territory.

Key Tasks:             

• Conduct passage of Lines into AO HAMMER;
• Site location for effective ambush.
• Engage any confirmed PRK forces within DSM.
• Maintain communications with higher units.

 

 

End State: Engage ENY unit(s) IOT deny ENY free movement.

 

MISSION (Platoon):MR2^nd PLT, C COO/O 2000 HRS until 2200 HRS conduct ambush on suspected ENY patrol route parallel to east-west creek, in vicinity of 486190.

 

Plan: To ambush enemy patrol along the north side of the creek.  Utilize an L shaped near ambush using the tall grass and weeds as concealment with 1 additional man 40 meters off the ambush site to cut down any runners or stragglers.

 

Performance: After discussing the mission with my APL we decided on taking a 5 man team, leaving 1 to pull security on the FLOT and the other on rest cycle. I tasked my APL with conducting the ambush since he is very capable. He had also been out on a few screening patrols throughout the day and therefore had intimate knowledge on enemy movements in the area. I briefed my men and then met with the FUC to conduct passage of lines. We had the guide take us through the lines and settled into our ambush not far from the release point maybe 25 meters from it. As we sat in the ambush the birds sang loudly and thundered about in the creek as the sun set (how were we going to hear anything with that racket?). An hour passed and we heard something on a loud speaker blaring in the distance, (maybe it’s intel the enemy is seeking from the location our team is setup in, who knows, the voices aren’t very clear) and then hours passed another. Weird things happen to a man pulling heightened security like that; heavily fatigued and focused, he starts to hear things, sometimes even see things if fixated on a point. As the visibility decreases your imagination fills in the gaps in visual feedback.  “RAT! TAT! TAT! TAT! TAT!” a burst of gun fire rings out at the back of our ambush sight, immediately followed by “OH SHOOT! I DIDN’T KNOW THAT WAS YOU!” One of our guys cooked off a few rounds at our OC that had moved up to observe us. “Well this ambush site is spoiled,” I tell the men. I had 2 men move the ambush site up the creek. I had the rest go with me to do a little recon on the loud speaker. The voices were now intelligible for the most part and maybe 400 meters from us. The remaining ambush team moved off, and I started moving my recon team. We moved 50 meters away and a thought flashed through my head (NOPE! this is probably a baited ambush I’m going to be walking into or at minimum a ruse to get me off mission). I rejoined my team and we settled back into our ambush as planned. Another 30 minutes passed and the loud speaker guys seemed to be moving about in a 300-meter grid south west of our position and are speaking hardcore Korean and wanting us to hand over our Austrian coalition partner. They cooked off a flare for good measure. With the clock fast approaching our mission’s NLT, I start to question if I should stay in place. I pull out my orders, I read:

 

( MISSION (Platoon):MR2^nd PLT, C COO/O 2000 HRS until 2200 HRS conduct ambush on suspected ENY patrol route parallel to east-west creek, in vicinity of 486190.)

 

Ok but I don’t think this is going to happen.  What is my commander’s intent? I read:

 

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose:       To deny ENY free movement within DSM territory.

End State: Engage ENY unit(s) IOT deny ENY free movement.

 

OK! GOT IT!

This ambush is OVER! We’re going to get them!

I get my guys up and brief them. The sun has now completely set. I switch on my NODs and we move up 150 meters west along the creek, then cut across it through a gap in the tree line. Moving south across a field I can clearly tell the position of their propagandist; he is directly west of us by the sound of it, but is there a team around him? Is this the ambush I feared? We got on line and started sweeping west. Prepare for contact! I spot what appears to be 3 silhouettes pulling 360 security in a tight formation maybe 2 meters apart from one another. I use my white light so that my men can engage. TREEs!…. moving on… we creep along another 50 meters and crest the hill. There they are! Less than 10 meters away. WOOSH!! A flare goes up! We all hit the deck. As the flare falls the shadows creep back over us. Back into total darkness. Its on!  Pop Pop Pop!… Pop Pop Pop! Our guns roar back and forth answering each other. I press my men forward. We take 40% casualties including myself. My APL rallies the men and withdraws back to the FLOT conducting passage of lines with the guide. The damage was dealt, the enemy got the message, their psyops campaign is over.

 

Fixes: Anyone got any suggestions on how to calm your nerves waiting in an ambush since I’m clearly not the only one that has this problem? Please sound off! Also, maybe I was too aggressive in the fight; hard to say. Even though we were very successful (if I’m correct the enemy sustained 85% casualties) I should have assessed my men’s night fighting capabilities before the engagement and conducted some kind of assessment if not wargamed it some beforehand.

Sustains: Commanders Intent was reached even though I disobeyed the mission. This was personally huge for me. I’ve been taught this in class but having done it in the field and going through that decision process solidified it in me. Before this moment my concern rested on mission and key tasks. Before this I don’t think I was even briefing my men on the commander’s intent once in the field. This single defining moment opened my eyes to the power and importance of commander’s intent. Huge sustain to white cell I couldn’t thank you guys enough for putting me in that situation!

 

 

 

 

COMMANDERS INTENT (Company):

Purpose: Regain ground lost to PRK

Key Tasks:             

• Conduct movement to contact.
• Pursue and destroy all ENY forces in AO HAMMER.
• Maintain communications with higher units.

 

End State: Locate and engage ENY unit(s) IOT destroy PRK forces within DSM, exploit PKF border weakness if possible.

 

MISSION (Platoon):MR2^nd PLT, C COO/O 0600 HRS until 1000 HRS Conduct a MTC North into AO HAMMER IOT destroy ENY forces vicinity near grid 48301905, advance along easting line 483, pursue into PRK territory, breach border at vicinity grid 483195, exploit breach in PRK line IOT destroy PRK HQ.

 

Plan: Get into position before 0600. Destroy all enemy units along easting line 483 using maneuver tactics.

Performance: After that night’s firefight we made it back to our patrol base and set the night security list same as the night before; it was heavily weighted for rest. Four people were chosen to pull 1hr security each and stand two was set for 0430. I wanted to get the guys up before first light just in case. Also, I needed time to get my guys organized and in place before 0600. 0430 came quickly and we got up, packed our rucks, and I briefed the men. The guide took us through the lines and we traveled to the southwest corner of our AO. The enemy was ready for us and engaged us before we got into the woodline. We pressed the attack and worked their flank but they had defense in depth and our attack stalled. From there we kept pressing them with the main body and working their flanks but they were making us pay for every blood soaked inch of ground. It became a war of attrition until ENDEX.

 

Fixes: We really needed to push their flank harder and perhaps should have committed 80% of my men to the maneuver element instead of the 30-50% I was doing. I could have got my men up even earlier, like 0230 but that pretty well would have left them with zero sleep.

Sustains: My men fought hard and we were gaining ground albeit slowly. We were giving about as good as we got.

 

Parting thoughts: General order of march was Vee formations performing either approach marches or search and destroy, however, night movements were generally performed in column file with frequent head counts.  All halts were accompanied by 360 security. Linear danger crossings were performed with patch to the road unless under enemy fire in which case we buddy team bounded. I believe this level of discipline paid huge dividends for us getting into the fight and starting it on good footing; many times the battles were decided in the first few seconds of the engagements. I’m very proud on my men, each and everyone one of them gave it 100%. No bullshit, they just all put out and kept putting out. I’ll be looking forward to serving beside them again!

Photo by Robin Werling

Dojo

When a prospective student asks what to look for in a school, he is usually directed to look for certified instructors, military and police experience, and even expensive tuition as a mark of quality education.  While these things may be good, some of the best schools I have attended were inexpensive, and staffed by civilians.  What the best schools all have in common, is the feeling of a karate Dojo. Dojo is a Japanese word meaning “place of the way”, or “a place of learning”.  Here in America it usually means, specifically, a martial arts school; and can refer to the building where the martial artists train, or to the organization itself.   I don’t mean they all trace their roots to the Orient, require the wearing of a gi, and train barefoot.  Some of them do, of course; but others trace their roots from a very western military tradition.  Some have no military roots, but have developed from the civilian training /competition world; yet they all bear most or all of the following trademarks of a dojo.

The traits of a dojo, as I see them, are rank, respect, community, mentorship, and learning through instruction.

The dojo trains its students, not for a qualification, test, or rank, but for the pursuit of excellence.  One common criticism of police and military training is that these organizations train students to qualify on an artificial test, rather than to study for mastery.  A good dojo recognizes progress through ranks, awards, and insignia, but does not see the rank/ insignia as an end in itself.

A dojo cultivates a culture of respect through uniforms, honorifics, and ceremonies. This respect runs both directions: from students to teachers, and teachers to students.  This is, perhaps, the most outwardly recognizable characteristic of a dojo, and also the most misunderstood.  The outward trappings of respect can be easily imitated, without adopting the culture of respect they are meant to signify,  much as the physical manifestations of love may be imitated without expressing actual love: “Would you betray the Son of Man with a kiss? “

This culture of respect is built on a community of fellowship, whereby an instructor recognizes that he must have students to teach and in order to understand his art, just as the student needs a master to introduce him to the art.  You don’t truly understand something until you are able to explain it to a novice.

“A teacher is a student who teaches in order to continue his study.”- Mochizaki Minoru Sense

Because of this, dojos develop their instructors in- house, and while they may have instructors with a wide variety of experience from other schools and or police/military training, they do not import “expert” or “celebrity” instructors from outside their ranks.  This forges mentor/ apprentice relationships, wherein students are expected to continue their education through teaching other students, and reinforces a culture where no one has arrived at perfection, but all are students of the art.

Dojo instructors are expected to demonstrate excellence in the art that they teach; they teach, and do.  You never see a dojo instructor take the attitude, “I don’t have to do that anymore”; they instruct by demonstration, and they lead by example.

Finally, dojos are not profitable organizations. I say this with trepidation, because any organization can be unprofitable through sheer ineptitude, but the dojo system is a pre-industrial model, and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to turn into a successful business.

“A true martialist is poor, for he trains for the spirit of the thing, rather than for gold.” Musashi

 

 

Getting More Range Time

We all want to shoot more, and we all have busy lives that keep us from shooting as much as we might like. Here are a few things that have helped me get out on the range more often, and get more shooting done when I do.

Be ready to go.  I keep my range bag packed.  That way, when I have a few minutes that I could shoot, I don’t spend my time looking around for my eye and ear protection, shooting mat, and ammo.  I keep a couple of range bags; one backpack is packed with things I will need no matter what type of shooting I do.  It contains eye and ear protection, a log book to record my session, stapler and staples, target pasters, a light weight shooting mat, binoculars, a shot timer with extra batteries, first aid kit, and blow out kit.  I also has a camelback water reservoir, and usually contains a few snacks.

Other bags are packed according to a specific type of shooting, or even a specific weapon.  I keep an ammo can full of gear specific to the M1 Garand. It contains 30 06 ammo and end-block clips, as well as a GI web sling. I have several bags specific to different hand guns, which contain the magazines they require, a holster and mag holder, dummy rounds, dummy barrel, and weighted dummy magazine.

The third part of my kit is also universal. It is another ammo box, with cleaning supplies, and a few basic gunsmithing tools.

Keeping my gear organized in this way allows me to efficiently use small blocks of time to train. I can easily throw these in the car, and be ready to go with little notice.  I often keep them in the car; that way, if I get off work early, I can take advantage of the time to shoot.  Back when I worked only a couple of miles from the range, having my kit in the car allowed me to shoot over my lunch hour.

I keep my magazines loaded, and I use the time I spend watching TV to load magazines; range time is too precious for that.

Because I often shoot on private ground, I store my targets and target stands at the range.  I picked up an old carpenter’s truck tool box at a flea market for this.  It works great for keeping things dry and ready to hand.

Another great addition to any range are steel targets. They can be left up all the time, and are easy to score.

A spotting scope can be a great time saver; for rifle shooting, this is a must.  Walking back and forth to the target line may be great exercise, but you will get more shooting done if you use a spotting scope to view your target.  A 40 power will pick up 30 cal holes at 200 yards.

Keep a notebook of drills.  Every time I find an interesting shooting drill, I write it down or print it off, and keep it in a binder in my target box.  That way, if I get to the range without a plan, I can flip through the binder to find inspiration.

These are all things I do that have helped me to shoot more often and more effectively.  If you have a tip that I haven’t mentioned, please leave a comment.  I’m always looking for new ideas.

When It Gets Real

How will I react “when it gets real”…  when it’s not just a game, a drill, or a score?  How will I preform when failure means my life, or, even worse, the lives of the people I love?  This is the question that haunts every martial artist.  And it should; after all, we invest a great deal of time and treasure preparing for the evil day. How disturbing would it be to have that day arrive and find that all has been for naught; that our Maginot line has been breached, and we are at the mercy of merciless men.  Trainers stay up nights worrying about this, too; or at least they should.  Generally, they approach this problem in one of three ways.

The first approach is what I will call Default to Training.  Jeff Cooper was an example of an adherent to the default- to- training method. This method holds that instinctive behavior can be modified; that we can focus on the front sight and not on the target, that we can hold the pistol “as gently as you would a live quail” while people are shooting at us.  We can gently press the trigger in a smooth rearward direction, while a homicidal maniac tries to kill us.  And there is validity in this; we have all heard veterans say things like:“my training took over, and it was just like a drill” or: “I could hear my drill instructor’s voice in my ear saying ‘front sight press’”. I remember one young Marine, freshly returned from Iraq, saying ,with awe and bewilderment: “All that stuff they teach you in School of Infantry, it really does work”.  Stories like these are reassuring; and, in truth, we all believe that what we do in training will have an effect when we are on the two way range. Yet there is always the nagging doubt that maybe it isn’t true, maybe it won’t work, and we have all heard and read enough stories to support these doubts.  Furthermore, if this approach is true, it can also be disconcerting; if we find we have trained ourselves to do the wrong thing.  Famously, California Highway Patrol Officer James Pence was killed as he worked to reload his revolver. Reportedly, the coroner found the empty brass of his spent cartridges in his pants pocket.  In a situation where split seconds meant the difference between life and death, he took the time to save his brass, because he had always done it that way on the range.  He defaulted to training.  We call these bad habits training scars, and it is a subject that deserves a post of its own.

The second approach is what I will call Default to Instinct. This school of thought holds that we can only modify behavior so much; in the end we will turn into cavemen seeking to fight, take flight or freeze.  Massad Ayoob is probably the modern pioneer of this method.  Early in his career he began interviewing cops who had been in gunfights. He found that the methods being taught in the seventies and eighties were not working in actual gunfights; at least, not very well.  He looked to modern scientific studies that found that under the stress of a life and death situation, the body reacts drastically; muscles become stronger, but lose their dexterity; some senses are sharpened, others are dulled; even the perception of time changes.  In light of this, and in combination of his findings from interviewing a great number of gunfight survivors, he developed his Stress Fire method.  This was basically an attempt to simplify the gun fighting methods developed by Jeff Cooper, and translate them into a system that would work well when the body was under the influence of adrenaline, as one would presumably be in a life or death struggle. Others have taken this much farther. Abandoning Cooper’s methods all together, they teach us to focus on the target, hold the pistol with a death grip, in addition to an entirely different concept of trigger control.

Rob Pincus is, perhaps, the most high- profile apostle of this method, although many of these techniques were taught by such old- timers as Ed McGivern and Rex Applegate, back in the twenties.

The danger with this approach (as I see it), is that in an attempt to teach people to fight with their instincts, bad habits are reinforced and ossified.  For instance, there is evidence that humans, when startled, bring their hands up in front of their faces in an instinctive reaction to protect that most vital part of the human anatomy.  Default- to- instinct instructors teach students to start all drills from the startle location.  So far so good, but who is to say they are not creating a training scar?  If my hands are at my belt when I am faced with a threat why would I bring my hands to my face first, then to the weapon in my belt?  To the default- to- instinct instructor, this self-fulfilling prophecy is not a training scar, but an affirmation of his doctrine that you will bring your hands to a position in front of your face when startled.  Instructors of this philosophy like to make cave man analogies, wherein they assert that modern weapons are nothing like the spears and clubs carried by Stone Age peoples.  They assume that our primitive ancestors used tools that worked with human instinct, and not in opposition to it.  I personally find this preposterous. The same skills (poise, a cool head under pressure, relaxed alertness) that will serve you well in a gunfight, will also serve you well when throwing a spear at that charging mastodon.

The third method is not espoused by any instructor I know of, but is probably the most widely- held by gun owners.  I’m calling this the Rise To The Occasion theory.  This theory holds that as long as one possesses a gun he will be able to deploy it effectively with little or no training, should the need arise. This is so preposterous, once it is put into words, that one wonders why it is so popular.   One instructor told me that for every hundred people who take his CCW class, which is mandated by law, only three come back for more training.  Using a gun effectively is a skill set somewhat similar in difficulty to driving a car; how many people would give their sixteen- year- old child the keys to the car after only eight hours of instruction?  Yet, most of those same people carry a lethal weapon with little more training than that.

As preposterous as this theory sounds to those who take their commitment as an armed citizen seriously, there is a body of evidence to lend some validity to this theory.

First, as poorly trained as most gun owners are, most criminals are even less so. Combined with that fact is the reality that most criminals have a profit motive, and will not risk getting shot simply to steal a wallet.  The truth is, it doesn’t take that much skill to deter the casual criminal.  Fortunately, the causal brigand seems to be the most common form of criminal in action today.

Secondly, there are instances of people who truly have risen to the occasion in a gunfight.  Case in point is F.B.I. agent Edmundo Mireles, who, in midst of the infamous Dade County shootout, figured out how to fire and reload a 870 Remington with only his weak hand, his right arm being totally destroyed by a rifle bullet.  It is noteworthy that men like Mireles are the exception, not the rule, and that while he had never practiced that technique before, his training and familiarity with that weapon system were certainly helpful to him when he had to learn it under fire.

While I agree with Clint Smith, who said: “The back alley at 2 am, faced with a gang of thugs, is not the best time to learn Kung Fu”, it is nice to know that it is possible to rise to the occasion; however, there is simply no way to foresee every possible problem that one might face.  Even if we could, it would be unwise to use up all of our training time studying the more obscure problems, to the neglect of the most useful and broadly applicable techniques.

In the end, while most instructors favor one or the other approach, all believe in and practice all three of the approaches outlined above, to a certain extent.  As a student, you will have to decide what makes the most sense to you and find an instructor that fits your personal preference.  You can usually read the school’s literature and find out rather quickly where their philosophy lies.

All of the anecdotal gunfights referenced here are recorded in Massad Ayoob’s excellent book the Ayoob Files.

Book review of A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry by Scott R McMichael

 

Light infantry is a much- misunderstood concept. Quite often light infantry is defined by the equipment they don’t have,  as in: “we don’t have helicopters like the cavalry, and we don’t have tanks like the mech/armor, so we must be light infantry”.  This book seeks to explain the characteristics of light infantry, and how such units are best led, deployed, and trained.

Here are a couple of points that stood out to me on the reading of this book.

1-I have always, somehow, thought of light infantry as highly trained or “elite”, but many of the forces profiled in this book were conscripts, and did not undergo extensive selection or training (their training was different from other infantry units, but not necessarily more strenuous).
2-Guerrilla/ insurgent tactics are not necessarily light infantry tactics, and vise-versa.  Prior to reading this book, those two were closely linked in my mind.
3-Dug-in positions were used extensively by many of these units. I had always thought the highly mobile nature of light infantry would preclude digging in; finding this was not so spurred me to read FM5-15
4-Marksmanship still matters. Repeatedly, the importance of accurate fire was mentioned.
5-Long- distance endurance marches were critical. I have heard more than one veteran of the Iraq war expound upon the irrelevance of the ruck march; then again, that was, by and large, not a light infantry conflict.
6-Pack animals are essential if you are going into territory without roads (see FM 31-27).
7-Light infantry is most effective when deployments are relatively short.

 

My friend and mentor, Dr. Christopher Larsen, read this review and added this comment, which is pertinent to anyone interested in the subject:

“And lastly…Light Infantry MUST NEVER find themselves in open or easily traversed terrain when combating mechanized/mounted forces!

Light Infantry can ONLY defeat Mech Infantry and Cavalry if they can channel these powerful forces into appropriate kill boxes.”

Care Under Fire

 This is a review I wrote up for a class I took in October 2014.

 I signed up for S & S training solutions Care Under Fire Course, because I teach a lot of firearms classes to some very novice students, and I wanted to be better prepared in case I should ever have to deal with a gunshot wound.  I had taken training with the Red Cross and my local ambulance district, but I was looking for something more in-depth, dealing specifically with trauma.

The class was primarily taught by Cole Sammons and Kyle Wright; combat infantry and EMT, and combat infantry medic, respectively.  While both of these men knew their material, and, to boot, had plenty of battlefield experience to back it up, what I appreciated most was their skill as teachers.  Although the students came from a variety of backgrounds, ranging from EMTs to guys with no experience, no matter what level of skill or knowledge a particular student had, they were always seeking to bring him up to the next level.

As the course name “Care Under Fire” would indicate, this class focused on the kind of care an infantryman might need to administer on the actual battlefield.  That being said, I should point out what this class is not.  You won’t be learning to set up an MASH unit and do direct blood transfusions, suture wounds, or re-inflate collapsed lungs.  This class focused on stabilizing the casualty, and getting him either back into the fight, or to a place where he could be safely evacuated.  If you are interested in the higher level, grid- down “ditch medicine”, I recommend you take this class first. Once you see the level of manpower required in just the initial treatment and evacuation of a critically wounded person, you may rethink your grid- down hospital fantasy.

The class was mostly hands- on, and used the crawl- walk- run teaching method.  First, we had a brief classroom session followed by hands- on practice of the various techniques and procedures.  Then we quickly moved to the obstacle course. A common fault of firearms/survival instructors is that they often water down the physical aspect of their subject matter.  I am happy to say that is not the case at S&S. We had to sprint, in full kit, 100 yards carrying two 5 gallon jugs of water, then low crawl 20 yards to our first casualty, while the op-for fired blanks and threw smoke grenades at us. Once there, we had to assess the situation, rally any comrades who could still fight, and neutralize the op-for. Only after we had stopped the incoming fire and established security could we begin moving and treating the wounded.

So why the blanks, obstacles and fireworks?  Simple. It all creates stress. It is relatively easy to sit in a classroom and apply a tourniquet. Things start to get more real when you are out of breath, and surrounded by smoke, noise and confusion.  Remember, a human being can bleed to death in as little as 3 minutes, so you want to be able to do this under any circumstances without fumbling.  Which brings to mind another point: these guys are combat medics, and some of what they teach is the exact opposite of what you will learn in the world of civilian first aid.  Not saying one is right and the other wrong; it all depends on the situation.

After the obstacle course, we moved on to fire team and squad- sized operations.  If you come to an S&S class, be prepared to do infantry stuff.  The emphasis of this class was medical, but we still got in some patrolling and reaction to ambush.  Again, this may seem out of place, until you think about it: no one schedules an emergency, they happen when you are trying to get other things done… again, more stress.

This doesn’t even begin to cover the things we learned in this class, but I hope to give an idea what it was like to anyone who might be interested. Be forewarned, it’s all about problem solving.  Cole likes to throw you surprises, and see how you deal with it.  He even tossed in a couple of moral and ethical dilemmas.

If you spend time around firearms and knives, or just like infantry stuff, I highly recommend this class.  You will learn how to treat trauma wounds and what supplies you need to do it.

For more information about S&S go to http://www.sstrainingsolutions.com/

Independence day with One Shepherd 2011

This is a report I wrote about the first shooting event I participated in with One Shepherd.  As I read it now, I am struck by how much my ideas about and knowledge of  small unit tactics have changed in the past six years.  Aside from editing some spelling and grammar, I am posting this just as I wrote it then.  

I spent the holiday playing army with One Shepherd.
  There were 12 men in the force I was assigned to, divided into three teams. Our mission was to patrol a 60 acre demilitarized zone, consisting of two fields grown over in waist- deep grass.  We did not know the mission of the other force, but they were divided into four 2 man teams who were to infiltrate, spy, and link up to ambush us.
We had night vision, they did not.
From 7 pm to 3 am, we saw no one.  Even with such a large force, patrolling 60 acres of tall grass is exhausting.  In a real life situation, I would not attempt it unless it were a high value standing crop.  Even so, I would not try to maintain constant watch, but send out a random number of patrols each night at random times.
A little after 3 am, all hell broke loose.  One of our teams made contact, and sustained 50% casualties, but the enemy was on the run.  We advanced on them, and again took two more casualties at a choke point in the road.  By now we were the mishmash survivors of the three original teams, with our most experienced leaders dead.  The enemy was doing a good job of breaking contact  (by which I mean returning fire long enough to slow us down then retreating.
They made their last stand near the crest of a hill just behind a bend in the road.
  We advanced up the hill by bounds for some 200 yards, which was exhausting, but fun, featuring lots of adrenaline.  Near the top, I was killed.  
All in all, I think we sustained 40 to 50% casualties, while only three of the enemy managed to escape.
Keep in mind that the guys on the infiltrating force were the oldest and most experienced; I pray I never face criminals with their level of skill.
In a real situation, I would concentrate on stealth more. The attitude of the defending force was, “this is our ground, we don’t have to be quiet, we belong here.”  Neither would I risk so many lives on an aggressive assault across known danger points, especially when the enemy is already doing what I want; running away.  This artificial aggressiveness is because fire fights are fun when you know that no one is really going to get hurt.
  I need to learn to shoot at night. Looking for your front sight outlined in the enemy muzzle flashes is a bad place to be.  I am installing a tritium front sight on my rifle.
It was great to perform this training exercise with a really classy bunch of guys, who were ready to help a new guy.
If you come out to one of their events, bear in mind the median age is about 20, so you will need to be ready to keep up.
All in all, I thought it was good training, and at 100 FRN, a real bargain.

For information about One Shepherd: http://www.1shepherd.com/